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Chapter 3 
Non-financial corporations: Changing 




The phenomenon of acquiring financial logic in managing joint stock companies 
which basic activities are conducted outside the financial sector wins interest in 
American literature mainly since the nineties of the 20th century. The carrier of this 
change are big corporations of American or Western-European origin. As they op-
erate across borders, patterns and problems associated with the discussed phenome-
non are transferred to the peripheral economies of the South, not missing the Eastern 
European EU member states. The effects are not limited to a new style of managing 
a multi-level stakeholder enterprise that is to corporate governance. Institutional 
changes in the domain of companies are transferred into state institutions, which in 
turn provide the framework for socio-economic policy in the countries concerned. 
According to Aoki (2001), the state constitutes of government and the rules that it 
(in part) sets and (with varying efficiency) enforces. It is perceived also as a sphere 
of political exchange between government and the private sector, the result of which 
is a certain order between them (Aoki, 2001, p. 152). That institutional order is sub-
ject to change in the domain of the state (polity) nowadays. Through various access 
channels corporations influence the decisions of the government. Dynamic process-
es of accumulation and of displacement lead over time to changes at the layer of eco-
nomic system as well as at the layer of economic policy (more Ząbkowicz, 2009).
The chapter deals with the case of the USA as the one which is best document-
ed. According to all the data it is in the United States where one should look for the 
* This paper was originally published in the Jagiellonian Journal of Management in 2016, 2(4).
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beginning of the process under consideration. The context created by the broad-
er economic policy is important, because interrelations between large business or-
ganizations and socio-economic policies seem to be bi-directional. Financialization 
of non-financial corporations in the United States is the outcome of a turn-about 
in macroeconomic policies, and of reforms initiated at the turn of the seventh and 
eighth decades of the 20th century. This change was in the sake of maintaining com-
petitiveness and ability to generate profits of domestic corporations. In the face 
of two oil shocks and the largest post-war recession in the seventies manufactur-
ing corporations required restructuring. New conservative-liberal economic pol-
icies implemented by the Reagan’s and Carter’s administrations as well as by the 
Fed, chaired by Paul Volcker, were to make competitive position of US compa-
nies stronger (Panitch & Gindin, 2005, p. 150). Favourable conditions for entre-
preneurs were to be created by increasing the scope of free market through the de-
regulation of state-controlled sectors and through their privatization, and due to 
macroeconomic-policy focus on reducing tax and para-tax burdens, and on reduc-
ing inflation as well. These changes were accompanied by liberalization of finance, 
which was among other things meant to lower the barrier of demand for business-
es. A surge in loans to the private sector (since the mid-seventies), and the increas-
ing role of consumer credit in relation to disposable income (from the early nine-
ties) could be observed (Lehman, 1997). The bank loans increasingly funded not 
only purchases of goods but also of variety of financial assets, with the latter lead-
ing to a series of price bubbles in stock and real estate markets, tolerated by the Fed 
because of the wealth effect (more Ząbkowicz, 2010). Corporations whose original 
domain was production became engaged in the leveraged purchases of financial as-
sets, this is of stocks, debt securities, real estate, derivatives, etc.
The topic of this chapter is the change in the accumulation pattern of manufac-
turing corporations, which involves growing share of income from trading finan-
cial assets and from lending. The change concerned meant revaluation of basic ob-
jectives of the organization as well as of relationships between the basic groups of 
stakeholders. Consequently, the hypothesis emerged on the new alliance between 
management of manufacturing corporations and management of financial institu-
tions.
The chapter reviews literature in purpose to draw attention to new problems 
of control which result from the change mentioned in the title. The hypothesis is 
posed that the convergence of managers’ interests both of non-financial corpora-
tions and of financial institutions could mean a weakening control, evenly in inter-
nal and external dimension. This situation may, among others, weaken incentives 
to promote quality management in non-financial companies.
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3.1. Management – new ideas and new institutional solutions1
The growing share of exclusively financial transactions in generating non-financial 
corporations income seems to be the key to understanding the change in their be-
haviour, at least in the class of large multi-divisional organizations.
Changes in the income structure of manufacturing companies can be meas-
ured, using balance-sheet data for a sample of large companies, as Krippner (2005) 
does. She proposes an indicator that makes it clear that currently non-financial 
corporations in the USA are less reliant on their original domain of activity. Espe-
cially in the case of manufacturing companies shift in pattern of generating prof-
its from operating activities to financing activities is evident. In 2001, income from 
finan cial operations generated by US industrial corporations almost equalled net 
income from operating activities (Krippner, 2005, p. 185). The former category that 
is portfolio income consists of interest, dividends and of income from asset trading, 
mainly share buybacks (Krippner, 2005, p. 174). The dimension of the phenomenon 
measured this way in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century multiplied 
as compared to the fifties and the sixties and ranged at three to five times higher. 
Some studies also confirm the growing interest in non-production and non-trade 
activity of leading European corporations. For example, one can refer to the data 
on the increase in income from financial operations compared to net income con-
cerning the leading companies in the food industry (Table 3.1). This group includes 
companies such as Danone, Nestle and Unilever (Palpacuer, Seignour, & Vercher, 








1996 26.6 101.7 48.8
1997 28.1 67.0 42.1
1998 32.6 116.0 54.9
1999 47.1 93.1 59.0
2000 33.3 68.1 46.2
Average 33.5 89.2 56.4
Source: Palpacuer, 2008, p. 32.
1 This section contains excerpts of the article: The growing importance of income from financial 
transactions in non-financial corporations (financialization) – institutional context (Ząbkowicz, 2009).
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The change in the pattern of accumulation captured in the referenced study is 
associated with changes in the system of coordination in the domain of corpora-
tions. Since the eighties of the twentieth century both in the United States and in 
Europe one can observe a process of installing corporate institutional arrangements 
that make boards of non-financial corporations inclined to gain revenues in the fi-
nancial markets.2 Owing to these devices the phenomenon turns out to be broad-
er than the current “technical” description could suggest. It develops along with 
changes in procedures for setting goals, in motivation systems, in controlling and 
in enforcement of tasks and obligations. For example, compensation of chief man-
agers through stock options made their earnings dependable on the prices of shares 
of the managed company (Palpacuer et al., 2008, p. 4). Thus, the interests of corpo-
rate managers have become more consistent with the interests of shareholders. For 
similar reasons, boards of directors make decisions about engaging in programs 
of share buybacks. The activity of managers of non-financial companies is strong-
ly oriented to reporting in accordance with the requirements of the financial mar-
kets. One of the examples is the implementation of the Economic Value Added 
Indicator, which was seen to have been introduced in the surveyed companies at 
the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century (Palpacuer et al., 2008, p. 4). 
Generally speaking, the indicator contains the difference between company’s gains 
from the operating activities and the remuneration of capital. The latter figure con-
tains, among others, the return on capital expected by investors. Allowing profits to 
shareholders ex ante constitutes a breakthrough to the previous practice of calcu-
lating it ex post as the rest which remained after claims of stakeholders having been 
satisfied. Institutional devices of this kind have shaped management style known as 
a “shareholder view.”
The procedural rules (institutions) under consideration are rooted in a system 
of ideas, normally referred to as focused on shareholder value creation. The corpo-
ration is seen as a device for enrichment of its owners and/or as a bundle of con-
tracts. In terms of the theory of transaction costs a company can be reduced to the 
sum of bilateral contracts between individuals who undertake rational and oppor-
tunistic decisions (Williamson, 1998). According to the agency theory and the the-
ory of property rights (Alchian, 1977; Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974) 
managers are salaried professionals whose job is to create value for shareholders. 
Human resources are treated like a commodity. If the price of an employee is not 
adequate to his or her contribution to value creation the company gets rid of him/
her (market-based human resources model). Likewise, relationships with other 
stakeholders, that is with managers of other companies, with banks, with suppliers, 
etc. become commodified.
2 The same process has been observed since the end of the nineties in Japanese keiretsu con-
glomerates.
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This tangle of interests, institutions and ideas implies conduct different from the 
previously dominating focus on a stakeholder (so called stakeholder view) which 
manifested itself, among others, in cultivation of traditional business relationships 
with employees, with banks, etc. Basically, the shareholder view recommenda-
tion for strategic corporate management is to “downsize and distribute” (Lazonick 
&  O’Sullivan, 2000; Crotty, 2005). Downisizing relates primarily to employment 
and labour costs, yet the distribution relates primarily to corporate profits being 
divided among shareholders. The first recommendation contains lay-outs either 
transfer of jobs to other countries via direct investment or outsourcing of tasks to 
other companies. Profits flow to shareholders mainly in the form of dividends or in 
result of the stock exchange operations. The significance of stock-exchange in the 
model seems to be extraordinary. Due to acquisitions and hostile takeovers of con-
trol packets of shares the capital markets mobilize and motivate the managers. Ac-
cordingly, it is maintained that a commitment to create value for the owners is con-
trolled by the market (market for corporate control).
Therefore, some authors hypothesize about a new alliance (Palpacuer, 2008). 
According to views close to the school of regulation the major decision-making is 
made by managers, and it is their job to decide both about strategy as well as about 
coalitions with other stakeholders. When mass production meant successful busi-
ness strategy, then Fordism was on the top and the role of stakeholders in the com-
pany was acknowledged. At that time managers together with engineers and oth-
er white-collar employees formed part of the so-called technostructure (Palpacuer, 
2008, pp. 5–6; Galbraith, 1973).
In the last decades of the 20th century strategies, management styles as well 
as alliances were subject to change. Corporate managers “discovered” a strate-
gy of global competition, which to a much greater degree relies on financial op-
erations like foreign investment, mergers and acquisitions, etc. where the game 
is primarily about the ratio of stock prices. Consequently, they began to identi-
fy their own interests with shareholder value creation which involved an amend-
ment of the rules of the game in the domain of businesses. It is emphasized that 
although the change has contributed to increasing convergence of interests of man-
agement with the interests of the owners of companies, strategy and coalitions are 
still a matter of choices made by corporate managers rather than a matter of influ-
ence of shareholders. Increased interest of management of non-financial compa-
nies in stock exchange-operations is combined with intense communication with 
financial analysts and brokers that is with investment managers; there were estab-
lished procedures of meetings and consultations of the representatives of boards of 
non-financial corporations with agents of financial markets. Similarly, the grow-
ing debt makes good relations with banks even more important. In recent decades, 
preferences and attention of managers seem to have moved from the staff to inves-
tors, or more precisely, to financial institutions, that is banks and institutional in-
vestors (Boyer, 2000; Sklair, 1998).
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3.2.  Relations with financial institutions – control or shared 
interest
The issue of alliances includes into perspective power relations and group interests, 
and thus makes to cross the conventional boundaries of corporate governance. In 
this regard the following changes seem to be important as far as non-financial cor-
porations concerned. First, the increased participation of representatives of finan-
cial institutions in the boards of these companies, which implies control issues. 
Secondly, manufacturing companies have become much more dependent on re-
sources provided by banks and financial markets, which has an impact on the bal-
ance of power.
Literature on control issues does not rely on the simple distinction made by 
Berle and Means (1991) between shareholders and managers alone, but examines 
the impact which creditors, mainly banks, and other financial institutions, main-
ly institutional investors, exert on non-financial corporations. During the seven-
ties of the twentieth century the issue of control with regard to non-financial com-
panies was seen in the context of debt repayment strategy and of participation 
in mergers and acquisitions (Kotz, 1978). The role of banks as creditors was im-
plied by the presence of their representatives in the corporate boards and stimulat-
ed research, to what extent, therefore, banks monitor and shape the behaviour of 
non- financial companies (Kotz, 1978; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi & Sterns, 
1994). Contemporarily, along with growing importance of financial markets in the 
strategy of large corporations, a growing share of institutional investors among ma-
jor shareholders has been observed (Palpacuer, 2008, p. 3). Does this mean that 
one can defend the thesis that shareholder view was imposed by the financial sec-
tor’s representatives present in the boards and general meetings of the non-finan-
cial companies? The debate did not end in a clear decision (Mizruchi, 1996; Davis 
& Thompson, 1994; Fligstein, 2002; Zorn, Dobbin, Dierkes, & Kwok, 2004).
Some studies challenge the view that the presence of institutional investors 
among the major shareholders played role in financialization of non-financial cor-
porations (Palpacuer, 2008 p. 3). Research on transnational corporations operat-
ing in food industry on a sample from the United States confirms the dominance 
of institutional investors among the largest shareholders (83%) in the end of the 
last century. Such ownership structure could be a partly explanation to the more 
pronounced focus of management decisions on profits from financial operations. 
However, the hypothesis which seems to have a strong foundation in the Ameri-
can experience weakens if one looks closer at the distribution of property in the se-
lected European companies. First, the role of institutional investors in the case of 
corporations from Europe is significantly lower (41%), and, further, it decreases if 
the UK is excluded. Secondly, in those cases where the involvement of institution-
al investors is the lowest, the concentration of capital in the hands of other inves-
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tors is extremely high. Those non-institutional shareholders of large corporations 
in mainland Europe are families and managers’ partnerships. In short, in this group 
of companies, with Dutch Heineken and French LVMH included, institutional in-
vestors have very little to say. Even in the two companies previously referenced as 
the examples of financialization, this is in Nestle and Danone, the role of institu-
tional investors seems to be incomparably smaller than in the surveyed US compa-
nies due to low concentration of capital in the hands of major shareholders. In the 
surveyed European companies, modelled according to the American design, such 
rules and controls gained popularity which channel managerial interest in non- 
financial corporations to stock markets and to other financial markets. With re-
gard to this re-orientation of managerial decisions in non-financial corporations, 
however, the cited studies, at least in the European context, do not provide a strong 
foundation to the view that owner supervision of financial firms played an impor-
tant role. At the same time they cast doubt on whether institutional investors were 
indeed the medium through which shareholder capitalism radiated from the Unit-
ed States to Europe.3
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that financial firms are to be found at the cent-
er of business connections of non-financial companies. While the facts of control 
are often difficult to be observed directly, dependence on the resources provided 
by financial institutions can be clearly demonstrated in numbers as well as via re-
construction of the historical process of change. We have just presented numbers 
showing significant and growing share of the profits from financial transactions in 
the income of non-financial corporations. This trend means increasing dependence 
in income generation on the availability and price of credit as well as on conditions 
in other financial markets. Additionally, the balance sheets of this sub-sector, which 
constitutes the core of the US economy, have shown dramatic increases of payments 
to financial markets and of spending on share buybacks as related to adjusted net 
income (cash flow). Such changes in the balance sheets of non-financial corpora-
tions were a reflection of the developments in the credit markets and in the equities 
turnover in the nineties of the twentieth century. Namely, since 1982 the indebted-
ness of US non-financial corporations in relation to net assets has grown rapidly. 
The stock-exchange boom between 1994 and 1998 caused an unprecedented reval-
uation of their assets. Along with a relatively easy growth of their market value, ex-
perienced in the second half of the nineties, increased their sensitivity to the stock 
quotes; due to the growing debt their sensitivity to interest rates increased as well 
(Crotty, 2005, pp. 84, 98, 99).
3 The shareholder view in management is popular in countries where business schools appear 
in considerable numbers. Opening up of the domestic financial markets in Western Europe in the 
eighties and in Central Europe in the nineties must be considered as one factor, and the recruitment 
of English-speaking managers for top positions in large corporations in continental Europe must be 
considered as another one (Palpacuer et al., 2008, p. 5).
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The rising asset value allowed for massive borrowing, while the credit leverage, in 
turn, allowed for expanding purchases of securities and financial instruments. Effec-
tively, along with growing debt grew also financial assets in relation to tangible assets 
(Crotty, 2005). Access to bank loans which are pledged by financial assets, stimulated 
demand and led to the stock market top, and, consequently, functioned as a leverage 
of income from financial operations to numerous actors. Banks offering credit to cor-
porations (the larger the more reliable) earn interest. Corporations, taking advantage 
of available credit, invest in financial assets. Brokers in the financial markets take their 
commissions from rising turnover and see their earnings increasing. Rising demand 
induces increases in stock prices and improves the instruments and indicators related 
to them, stock options and EVA alike. Shares and other financial assets whose pric-
es are rising are accepted as a pledge by banks who are willing to grant further loans. 
Firms being encouraged by income indicators, and being aware that the latter trans-
form into interest of financial investors, use bank loans as before. As long as credit is 
available and the prices of financial assets are growing, the logic of leverage makes all 
parties of these transactions happy. Thus, both debtors (non-financial corporations) 
and creditors (banks) as well as institutional investors and financial markets interme-
diaries are interested in maintaining this situation.
In short, in the last decades of the twentieth century the mechanism of financial 
leverage allowed to multiply profits without undertaking production activities; thus 
industrial capital, which recognized the role of more aggressive finance in generat-
ing profits, went hand in hand with interests of financial capital (Panitch & Gindin, 
2005, p. 151; Krippner, 2005; Arrighi & Silver, 1999).4
Contemporary relations between non-financial firms and their partners from 
finan cial sector lead to the following conclusions. The problem of control of a manu-
facturing corporation by banks and other financial institutions which is developed in 
literature should not obscure the importance of convergence of interests between in-
dustrial and financial companies. Evidence that the financial companies control non-
financial ones is rather difficult to grasp. However, some research confirms the im-
portance of revenues from operations in money markets and from trading financial 
assets, which in the nineties accounted for nearly a half of incomes of non-financial 
corporations. This phenomenon seems to be the key to understanding the changes 
in their behaviour and strategies (Krippner, 2005, pp. 201–202). However, data ag-
gregated, for example at the sector level, rather mask the size of the change. The phe-
nomenon of the growing importance of revenues from the exclusively financial trans-
actions becomes clear at the level of companies as result of studying their financial 
statements. In total, the issue of who controls whom has lost its importance under 
new circumstances where both financial institutions and non-financial firms share 
interest in using financial leverage and in trading financial assets.
4 The contemporary return to finance should be seen as a single precedent in the rich history 
of such rounds.
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Conclusions
The chapter refers to the literature which indicates a significant interest of US 
non-financial corporations in the non-production and non-commercial activities. 
A measure of this phenomenon is the share of income from interest and turnover of 
financial assets as well as of dividends, which at the turn of the twentieth and twen-
ty-first century accounted for almost half of the total income of the surveyed com-
panies. We probably look at the change in pattern of accumulation, whereby the in-
come from core operations of US non-financial corporations constitutes no longer 
the major income. Such change in structure of income of these companies is the 
starting point to the characteristics of fundamental change in the management style 
to be observed in the past decades. It seems to explain both the strategy and the 
new institutional solutions, referred to as the shareholder view management and 
the shareholder value creation. Corporate boards motivated in line with the ideol-
ogy of shareholder value creation see their interests more aligned with the interests 
of shareholders, however, competitive strategy and coalitions of stakeholders seem 
to be still primarily a matter of the managerial choices.
The chapter refers to the fact of the increased participation of representatives 
of financial institutions in some boards of non-financial companies and raises the 
question whether this fact contributed to the managers’ seeking revenues to more 
extent in the financial markets. The sources reviewed do not provide a strong evi-
dence for the role of financial members of boards in the re-orientation of corporate 
governance. Importance should be given to the growing dependence on resources 
obtained in banks and in the financial markets rather than to the balance of power 
in corporate structures. The addiction stems from the fact that global competition 
implies a much greater reliance on financial operations, with share prices and cred-
it leverage playing a pivotal role. There is no doubt that financial firms are situated 
at the very center of business connections of non-financial corporations. The bal-
ance sheets of the sub-sector confirm this finding, providing the indicators quot-
ed in this paper, such as a significant share of profits from financial transactions in 
total income, an increase in financial assets in relation to physical assets, a relative 
increase in payments to the financial markets as well as in spending on share buy-
backs, increased indebtedness due to credit as related to the net assets, etc.
The review indicates the relatively new phenomenon of financialization of non-
financial corporations and opens up questions about its possible consequences. The 
findings inspire to put forward a number of issues requiring further research.
Firstly, traditional roles in relations between manufacturing companies and 
finan cial intermediaries change. The growing share of profits from exclusively finan-
cial operations suggests that non-financial corporations less than in the past require 
borrowing in order to maintain the liquidity and continuity of the production and 
marketing processes, whereas banks consider respective loans to be a diminishing 
segment of their business.
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Secondly, the interests of creditors and investors more than in the past seem to 
be consistent with interests of market-controlled companies, and come together on 
the financial markets. The increase in turnover of financial assets is the source of in-
come to all participants of financial markets, this is to intermediaries in the trans-
actions on commodities, securities and derivatives as well as to financial investors 
and to banks who support investment with credit, having become a major concern 
of non-financial corporations since several decades as well. The mechanism of lev-
erage enables profits without production.
Thirdly, the reconfiguration of interests weakens oversight over the internal and 
external pro-effective processes in the domain of companies. Under new circum-
stances, both the creditors and financial investors seeking investment opportunities 
in the open market may be less interested in the productive performance, coming 
out from improvement in product quality, manufacturing process and competent 
management. Indeed, they attach importance to the financial indicators. The latter 
can often grow faster than the efficiency of core-business activities allows thanks to 
high profitability of exclusively financial operations. In the eye of creditors or “mar-
kets,” the results due to increases in share prices or interest are likely to compensate 
the lack of managerial and/or engineering achievements.5
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